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University of Leeds. 
This Working Paper presents results obtained using the MVA START model for London, with 
the primary intention of investigating the distributional impact of road pricing in various forms 
and at various levels. In order to look at distributional effects the START model had to be 
'disaggregated' by income groups - three each for non-car owning and car-owning households. 
Initially, this allowed us to see the distributional impact of the LPAC Preferred Strategy, mainly 
involving public transport and traffic management policies. Beyond this we tested three structures 
(or 'regimes') of road pricing, varying from a complex three cordon plus scrccnlines structwe, to 
a single Central London cordon. Somewhat surprisingly, the latter was found to be regressive in 
its application. The structure with the highest benefits, as well as being relatively progressive, 
was the complex structure of three cordons plus screenlines, with an optimum charge level of 50 
pence per cordon crossing, each way but with the outer two cordons being peak only. 
KEY-WORDS: Roadpricing; distributional impact; public transport; trafSic managementpolicies; 
cordons 
Contact'. Tony Fowbes, Institute for Transport Studies (tel: 0532 335340). 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This Working Paper presents the results obtained by the ESRC project "Assessing the henefits and 
incidence of road pricing in London" (May and Nash, 1990). The principal aims of this project 
were to examine both the size of the overall benefits from alternative road pricing schemes for 
London and the degree to which different groups in society gain or lose from its introdu~2ion. 
Previous studies led us to believe that there would be substantial overall benefits from road 
pricing, but that there was little evidence on the degree to which different groups would gain or 
lose. Obviously in general, one would expect road users to dishenefit from the increased charge, 
which would persuade some people to change their travel behaviour and thus reduce congestion. 
Because this disbenefit would be partly offset by the gains they made from faster journeys, the 
overall disbenefit to road users should be less than the revenue gained hy government and 
available for redistribution. However, some groups of road users might actually gain from road 
pricing even without redistribution of part of the revenue to them. These include bus operators 
and users, freight operators, and high income car users, who were happy to pay the charge for the 
faster journey times they could now achieve. 
To examine these issues, we needed use of a computer model which was able to reflect the large 
number of ways in which road users might respond to charges, including changing the numher 
of journeys they make, time of travel route, destination and the means of travel they use. The 
most suitable model available to us appeared to be the START model developed hy the 
consultants MVA (Bates et al, 1991), and we worked with them to apply this model to London 
with funding partly from the London Planning Advisory Committee (LPAC, 1992). We also 
obtained a programme, EVAL, which measured the scale of the benefits and costs to each group 
identified within the model. However, to look at the effects on different income groups, we had 
to modify the model to break down the two categories of car-owning and non car-owning 
households each into high, middle and low income households. This was achieved using data 
from the 198516 National Travel Survey. We also made a thorough review of the evidence on 
the value different income groups place on their time savings and of the sensitivity of their travel 
decisions to the cost of travel (Fowkes et al, 1993). These stages of the work took longer than 
anticipated and reduced the number of options we were able to examine. Nevertheless, we 
achieved some interesting results. 
After some experimentation, it was decided to use the prediction year 2001 as the basis for 
comparisons since this was consistent with earlier work for LPAC. We have chosen resource 
values of time for evaluation purposes and there is room for disagreement as to which values 
should be used. Unless otherwise stated, we have for evaluation purposes used the same resource 
values of time for all household types. 
Section 2 reports tests with the aggregate model; section 3 discusses disaggregation of the model 
by income group. We then look in turn at the base situation with the disaggregate model, the 
optimal level of pricing for each of three different road pricing regimes and the implied changes 
of traffic in these regimes. Some sensitivity testing is undertaken before we draw our conclusions. 
2. TESTS WITH THE AGGREGATE MODEL 
The London START model, as installed at Leeds ITS, contained a division hetween car owning 
and non-car owning households, although both groups were given an identical value of time. Our 
initial experiments with the START model looked at traffic data for Central London with the 
LPAC Preferred Strategy for 2001, with road pricing implemented at differing charging levels. 
In addition to road pricing, the Preferred Strategy included suhstantial public transport investment, 
fares reductions and the use of road space for traffic calming. The road pricing strategy tested 
was a somewhat complex one involving three cordons around Central London and a set of 
screenlines within the central area (LPAC, 1990). 
The results are presented here as Table 2.1. Car mode share declines by a suhstantial proportion, 
with a transfer to bus and not rail. The percentage reductions in flow are greater off-peak. 
Speeds improve both in the peaks and inter-peak, with the slowest speeds still being in the inter- 
peak. 
Table 2.1: The effect of road pricing on travel and traffic. Aggregate START model (X). 
LPAC Preferred Strategy. 
- 
Table 2.2 shows the benefits from the LPAC Preferred Strategy, with and without road pricing. 
All benefits are shown relative to LPAC's Strategy 1, which represents continuation of current 
policies. As elsewhere in this report they refer to the single year 2001. The XO column shows 
the results for the LPAC Preferred Strategy without road pricing (LPAC Strategy 2). There ace 
costs for government, but large gains for households, freight and operators. The remaining 
columns show the benefits with various levels of road pricing, using the LPAC road pricing 
structure. Three different levels of (each way) crossing charge are tested (2Sp, Sop and lOOp per 
crossing in either direction). From the point of view of total benefits, the best of these charge 
levels is 50p, and rough interpolation suggests an overall optimum charge of about 4Sp. 
A clearer impression of the effect of different charge levels will generally be gained by expressing 
the benefits with respect not to the LPAC Strategy 1 (as in Table 2.2) hut to the LPAC Prefemd 
Strategy. This is done in Table 2.3, largely to set the pattern for later results tables. Naturally, 
our conclusions regarding optimal charge levels are the same as above. It is notable that them 
are substantial benefits for local government (the assumed recipient of revenues) and dishenefits 
for households. 
Table 2.2: Benefits compared to LPAC Strategy 1 of the LPAC Preferred Strategy with and 
without road pricing, with the aggregate START model (denoted X). ~igureHin ;Em for 
2001. 
Table 2.3: Effects of adding road pricing to the LPAC Referred Strategy, with the 
aggregate START model (denoted X). Figures in Em for 2001. 
Code 
Crossing Charge 
Households 
Freight 
Operators 
Local Government 
UK Government 
TOTAL 
It will be seen that public transport, and in most cases freight operators, gain from road pricing, 
as does local government. Households and central government lose, the latter from lost tax 
receipts. In the form of the model we used, public transport operators' profits are not ploughed 
back into improved services or lower fares. 
XO 
0 
147.4 
23.5 
47.6 
-18.7 
-0.3 
199.5 
Code 
Crossing Charge 
Households 
Freight 
Operators 
Local Government 
UK Government 
TOTAL 
X25 
2 5 ~  
41.7 
20.8 
79.9 
84.9 
-9.5 
217.8 
X25 
2 5 ~  
-105.7 
-2.7 
32.3 
103.6 
-9.2 
18.3 
X50 - 
SOP 
-29.8 
38.8 
93.0 
137.2 
-14.2 
224.9 
X50 
SOP 
-177.2 
15.3 
45.4 
155.9 
-13.9 
25.4 
X! 00 
loop 
-131.4 
54.4 
115.0 
169.3 
-19.8 
187.5 
XlOO 
1 OOp 
-278.8 
30.9 
67.4 
188.0 
-19.5 
-12.0 
3. DISAGGREGATING THE MODEL BY INCOME 
3.1 PURPOSE 
In this section we will essentially be doing two things. Firstly a six way split of the households 
of London will be made, being two car ownership levels by three income levels. Secondly we 
shall associate with these a value of time for each START journey purpose. In the aggregate 
model as used at Leeds ITS, and reported in Section 2 above, only a single value of time was 
used, to retain consistency with earlier tests (LPAC, 1992) although there was the possibility of 
inputting separate values for car owners and non-car owners by each of the seven journey 
purposes described in Section 3.3. Section 4 will report on the effect this disaggregation has had, 
using disaggregated values of time whose derivation is described below. 
3.2 DATA SOURCES 
Values of time, principally derived from the DOT Value of Time Study (MVA, ITS, TSU, 1987) 
were set out by journey purpose in Working Paper 345 (Fowkes, Sherwood, and Nash, 1993). 
That Working Paper was originally written on the assumption that the START model would use 
11 categories of trip, as had its predecessors for Edinburgh and Bristol. Belatedly we discovered 
that this was not the case, and this caused us difficulties as will be described below. WP 345 was 
later amended. 
The source of our income distribution data was the DOT 1985-86 National Travel Survey (NTS), 
kindly provided to us by the ESRC Data Archive. This gave us the proportions of journeys 
falling into each income band, by journey purpose. Had we not required a breakdown by journey 
purpose, then we could have used the numbers of households to get our distribution. As we 
wanted to consider journey purpose we were forced to use trip weighted distributions of 
households. This, however, is exactly what we want for the next stage of our work, i.e. using in 
the disaggregate model values of time whose average equals that used in the aggregate model. 
3.3 CHOICE OF CATEGORIES 
Difficulties with the START model have constrained our ambitions in this work. Taking first the 
categorisation of JOURNEY PURPOSE, this is incompatible with that used in the Value of Time 
study. The latter study found for cars, values of time highest for Employers' Business, and lowest 
for Commuting with "Other" corning in between. We will refer to this "Other" as "Leisure". 
START uses the following journey purposes: 
Home Based Work (HBW) 
Home Based Education (HBE) 
Home Based Other (HBO) 
Non Home Based (NHB) 
where the first three are broken down by tolfrom home. These seven journey purpose categories 
are used here. 
It follows from the distribution of VOTs by purpose that if the proportion of Employers' Business 
trips in HBW is relatively small, we will get an average value of time not too different from that 
for Leisure. We therefore decided to use for all START journey purposes the relationship 
between value of time and Income derived for Leisure in WP 345. As income distrihutions will 
vary by journey purpose, so VOTs will also vary by journey purpose. Indeed, since as will be 
seen we have a good estimate of average incomes within each income band and these too valy 
by journey purpose, it transpires that VOTs vary by purpose a little even within a given income 
band. Effectively, however, we have lost any effect of a given traveller's value of time varying 
due to the type of journey he is making, and this should not be lost sight of. 
Turning to the income categories, START currently subdivides all its matrices and manipulations 
into two household Car Ownership Categories (NONE and SOME). It was felt simpler to expand 
this dimension rather than try to add an extra dimension to START. The latter would have 
required extra loops to be set up, whereas the former only requires the upper loop limit to he 
redefined once. We chose to retain the non car-owninglcar-owning division 'dnd to split each into 
three (different) income bands. We chose these after seeing the distrihutions for NTS journeys 
by London households. For non car-owning households (CO) the hands chosen were £0-SK, £5- 
10K and £10+K. For car owning households (Cl) the bands chosen were £0-lOK, £10-20K, and 
£20+K. The bands are measured in 1985 pounds, and this convention is maintained throughout. 
Some income growth will have occurred after this date but that is ignored. 
In summary we have seven journey purpose categories, broken down by six car ownershiplincomne 
categories. As START already has the division by car ownership, it remains for us to provide the 
proportion of journeys for each journey purpose at that car ownership level by the relevant three 
income bands. This is done in the next subsection. We then require the average income in each 
of our 42 categories. Measured in 1985 pounds these are then converted to 1985 values of time 
and finally to reciprocal 1989 values of time as required for START. This is done in subsection 
3.5. 
3.4 INCOME DISTRIBUTIONS 
The initial level for us to work at with the NTS data was the household level, although even this 
took much effort due to the enormous size of the NTS data set relative to modem day computing 
systems workspaces, particularly given the scratchspace requirements of Statistical Packages. We 
used SPSS since a set of SPSS control cards were provided by the ESRC Data Archive, who we 
must thank for providing the data tape commendably quickly. However, most of the control lines 
needed a full stop adding and we found it desirable to make other subtle changes. 
A particular problem was that, although the survey data is stored in hierarchical form, the data 
on vehicles is separated out into a separate file. We have no hopes of being able to recombine 
this with the other survey data. We presume the reason for the separation is that one or more cars 
might be associated with more than one traveller and so the position in the hierarchy would be 
unclear and require detrimental assumptions to be imposed. One consequence of not having the 
vehicle records in a form cross-classifiable with households is that we cannot classify househ:holds 
by car subsidy levels as we had desired. In any event it would have been extremely difficult to 
have tried to classify individual trips by car subsidy level, which is what we really would have 
liked. 
Having lost the reason to work at the household level we determined to try to work at the journey 
level. This was not straightforward, and in the meantime some work had been done at the 
household level. Nevertheless, when it became possible to work at the journey level this work 
was redone (and is presented below). The logic of working at the journey level is that rwad 
pricing will affect individual trips (for a particular purpose, by a person from a car owning 
household or not, and with a given household income). If a certain section of the population 
never make car trips in London (say those for non car owning households with income he1:low 
f5K) then they will not be represented in the traffic. Similarly, if richer households make more 
car trips than average, then we should take account of this when considering what the reaction 
of current traffic will be to the imposition of road pricing. Perhaps we should have gone further 
and only taken car journeys, but this would have severely depleted our data on non-car owning 
households and anyway seemed wrong as any journey could potentially have been made hy car. 
Fortunately, it proved possible (if difficult and messy) to match the START journey purpose 
categories with the combinations of replies to four NTS questions (with two different codings!). 
We selected households only in Inner or Outer London, although their journeys need not be 
located there and other households will have made journeys in London. Table 3.1 shows the 
results in percentage form within car ownership levels. Income bands and Journey Purposes are 
as discussed in subsection 3.3, with the suffix "IF denoting FROM HOME and "IT denoting TO 
HOME. The figures look plausible. Naturally, journeys-involving work tend to he made'rrom 
richer households then average. Journeys by car owning households are from greatly richer 
households than those by non-car owning households. Non-home-based journeys seem to have 
a fairly average household income distribution, possibly an indication that they should not he 
taken as a proxy for Employer's Business trips. In fact, the NTS definition of non-home-based 
journeys was very wide since any deviation from route to a main destination was deemed to he 
a destination in itself, whereafter the continuation journey was automatically non-home-hased. 
For example, a visit, other than fleeting, to shops on the way home from work would he a NHB 
followed by a HBO/T and not just a HBW/T. Note that no attempt has been made to weight trips 
by distance. 
Table 3.1: Percentage of journeys by London households of a given car ownership level by 
income for seven journey purposes 
Source: NTS, 1985-86. Income bands in 1985186 prices. 
Note: Figures in brackets are sample sizes, the grand total being 51843 journeys. 
6 
3.5 RECIPROCAL VALUES OF TIME 
The parameter input to START requires reciprocal Values of Time in 1989 prices. The method 
of deriving these has already been stated, and this section gives the detail and the results. It 
should be noted that considerable accuracy has been held where possible. although the final results 
are only given in much rounded form. NTS recorded exact incomes where availahle, hut these 
are tabulated on our tape in f 1000 p.a. bands up to £15000 pa, then £2500 p.a. hands till £25000 
p.a. As always, these are in 198516 prices and we took only London households. Again we 
worked at the journey level, and so can present results by the seven joulney purposes. 
From a consideration of raw tabulations, three way divisions by income were detennined for non- 
car owning and car owning households separately, as has already been stated. Average incomes 
in 198516 prices within these income bands are given in Table 3.2 by journey purpuse. These 
look reasonably plausible. The £15878 for CO, f lOK +, HBOE looks too high, hut has been 
checked. A possible explanation is that rich non-car owning household travellers are more than 
averagely likely to travel to work from home, then on to an "other" destination and then return 
to home from there. This seems sufficiently plausible not to recheck, particularly as supporting 
evidence comes from HBWF > HBWIT for this group. It should also he noted that, even with 
sensible choice of income bands, the sample sizes are not everywhere sufficiently large to totally 
overcome sampling variation, and so small variations may not be important. 
Table 3.2: Average incomes in 198516 prices in 198516 income bands for non-car owning and 
car owning households journeys by seven journey purposes 
Source: NTS 1985-86. All in 198516 prices. 
At this point we needed to convert the incomes in Table 3.2 into Values of Time, using the 
relationships set out in WP 345. There was a strong temptation to use the car values of time for 
the car-owning households and some public transport values of time for the non-car owning 
households. However, road pricing will mainly affect car journey travel, so it is the proper 
conversion for these effects that we seek. Furthermore, the use of low base Values of Time for 
non-car owning households seemed undesirable on a priori grounds. 
A further complication is that the DOT Value of Time study reports Values of Time for the car 
as a whole, including all occupants. The Department on receiving these results, however, decided 
to use the values for car drivers, and multiply them up to take account of occupants. Hence we 
have another reason for not using the obviously per person values for public transport modes 
together with these car values. We decided to use the car VOT v Income relation from Table 1 
in WP 345 for journey purpose Leisure for all the incomes in Table 2. The reason for not 
adjusting according to the WP 345 journey purposes was discussed earlier. We had determined 
an adjustment to the price levels used by START (presumed to be 1989) and this was applied at 
the same time reciprocals were taken. The results now suitable for input to START are given in 
Table 3.3, rounded to two decimal places. 
Table 3.3: Reciprocal values of time in 1989 prices for 198516 household income bands by 
journey purpose and non car-owning and car-owning household journeys (in 
minuteslpenny). 
Source: Table 2 above, plus Table 1 of WP 345 using a 1.25 factor to convert from NTS prices 
to START prices. 
Note: The current value in START is 0.205. The average of the above figures is close to this at 
0.20, the large number of journeys in the Cllf20K + group pulling the average down. 
In order to compare benefits to individual household types from the START model runs we need 
to know how many households fall into each household type. NTS gives us this information for 
198516, and this is reported in Table 3.4 both by number of households and by number of 
journeys they make. The START model data is for 2001, though, so some adjustment is 
necessary. In LPAC (1990), LTS planning data for 2001 is quoted, giving a breakdown between 
car owning and non-car owning households. MVA (1992) state the assumed growth rate of 
motorised trips up to 2001. By careful editing of this information, revised projected household 
distributions for both household numbers and trips have been calculated and are presented in 
Table 3.4. Also shown is the projected distribution of persons, assuming household s i x  to remain 
constant within household types. In this table, and subsequently, the codes, C01, C02, C03, C11, 
C12 and C13 have been used for the six household types. 
Table 3.4: Definition of household types and their distributions, in terms of numbers and 
of journeys, in 198516 and 2001 
4. THE BASE SITUATION WITH THE DISAGGREGATE MODEL 
Household 
Type Code 
CO1 
C02 
C03 
C11 
C12 
C13 
In this study we have taken as our base situation the LPAC preferred strategy without road 
pricing. This is derived from a run of the START model, forecasting for the year 2001. The 
assumptions included for this preferred strategy have been set out in section 2, but the 
distributional effects have not before been presented. 
Table 4.1 shows that of the f210M p.a. of benefits resulting from the preferred strategy, some 
f 148M relate to households, i.e. are benefits to individual passenger travellers. The distribution 
of benefits can be seen to broadly mirror the distribution of trip making by household types, with 
a slight tendency for the richer households to come off best. Here, as elsewhere unless otherwise 
stated, a single evaluation value of time has been used. If we were to assume instead that values 
of time increase as incomes increase, then in situations such as the present case where we can 
assume that all income groups are receiving some time benefits, the effect will be to furfher 
favour richer households. A fully detailed investigation of such effects would require differential 
values of time by mode as well as income to be used, but this was beyond the scope of the 
software we were using, even if suitable input values of time could have been determined. 
Car? 
NO 
NO 
NO 
YES 
YES 
YES 
Compared to the distribution of the actual number of households by type (in 2001), rather than 
their trip making, the preferred strategy can be seen to clearly benefit the richer car-owning 
households disproportionately. The 18% of poor non-car owning households get only 5% of the 
benefits. Even rich non-car owners do no better than benefit in proportion to their numbers. Poor 
car-owning households benefit less than proportionally, even more than was the case when using 
the trip-weighted distribution of households. As was mentioned earlier, if a value of time related 
to household income had been used, these effects would have been magnified further. 
Columns X and Z in Table 4.2 compare the results of Table 4.1 with column XO of Table 2.2. 
We see reasonable agreement. There is close agreement on the total of benefits to householders 
from the LPAC Preferred Strategy, and this is principally the area we are interested in. The 
freight benefit is reduced. The benefit to operators is nearly identical to what it was. Local 
government, however, has much smaller disbenefit. Overall the effect is to raise the total benefit 
from f199.5M p.a. to E210.OM p.a. We are unable to explain these small discrepancies. 
Income 
Band 
-&5k 
£5-1Ok 
f10k 
-ElOk 
£10-20k 
f 20k+ 
198516 % 
of house- 
holds 
22 
8 
9 
16 
27 
18 
198516 
% of 
trips 
7 
5 
7 
14 
36 
30 
2001 % of 
households 
18 
7 
7 
18 
30 
20 
2001 
% of 
trips 
6 
4 
6 
15 
38 
3 1 
2001 
%) of 
persons 
10 
6 
6 
16 
35 
27 
- 
As an experiment we tried running the disaggregate model with a single value of time, i.e. the 
modifications to allow income disaggregation within START were made, hut the same (reciprocal) 
value of time was used for all household types and journey purposes. The results are shbwn in 
column Y. The disaggregate model used with varying values of time was a closer match for the 
aggregate model than was the disaggregate model with all of the values of time set to that of the 
aggregate model. 
Table 4.1: Distribution of benefits for the LPAC Preferred Strategy compared to LPAC 
Strategy 1, with the disaggregate START model 
Table 4.2: Comparison of benefits (;EM in 2001) from the LPAC Preferred Strategy using 
(a) the aggregate model (X); (b) the diiaggregate model with a single value of time (Y); (c) 
the disaggregate model with values of time varying by household type and journey purpose 
(Z) 
Household Type 
CO1 
C02 
C03 
C11 
C12 
C13 
Households 
Freight 
Operators 
Local Government 
UK Govenunent 
TOTAL 
TOTAL 1 199.5 1 211.7 
Percentage of 
households in 
2001 
18 
7 
7 
18 
30 
20 
100 
Household Types 
CO1 
C02 
C03 
C11 
C12 
C13 
Households 
Freight 
Operators 
Local Government 
UK Government 
Percentage of 
trips in 2001 
6 
4 
6 
15 
38 
31 
100 
147.4 
23.5 
47.6 
-18.7 
-0.3 
7.6 
8.1 
12.8 
18.5 
54.6 
46.7 
148.3 
18.5 
46.7 
-0.9 
-0.8 
Benefit 
(EM in 2001) 
7.5 
8.1 
12.8 
18.5 
54.4 
47.0 
148.1 
18.6 
47.5 
-3.5 
-0.7 
210.0 
Percentage of 
household 
benefits 
5 
6 
9 
12 
37 
32 
However, it will be noted that all three sets of results are telling the same broad story. As the Y 
results are clearly closer to the Z results than to the X results, it is probably safe to say that the 
major part of the difference between the X and Z results is due to the process of disaggregating 
START by income type, rather than due to the method of disaggregating the values of time used. 
5. THE IMPACT OF ROAD PRICING FOR THE LPAC FORM OF 
ROAD PRICING (STRUCTURE A) 
In the present study three structural forms for road pricing in London were tested. The first, the 
one used in the LPAC study, had charges for crossing (either way) three cordons, and a set of 
screenlines in Central London. The second structure tested will be charges just for crossing the 
three cordons. The third and final structure tested will be for crossing the central cordon only (ie 
the innermost cordon). The central cordon is located just inside the Inner Ring Road. The two 
other cordons are both in what is termed "Inner London". The outermost of these cordons is just 
inside the North and South Circular roads. Measured from Charing Cross, the three cordons are 
roughly 3km, 5km and 8km out. A map is contained in the TASTE Ill report (LPAC, 1990). 
The Skm and 8km cordons are 'peak only' while the central cordon and screenlines operate both 
peak and off-peak. All charges are in both directions. 
We shall denote the LPAC structure by the letter A and so the LPAC test becomes "ASO, i.e. Sop 
per crossing on the LPAC structure. Charging on just the three cordons, i.e. without the 
screenlines, is denoted by the letter B. Charging on just the central cordon will he denoted by 
the letter C. Throughout the tests for SCructms A and B, the charges were equal on all cordons. 
The remainder of this section will report on sensitivity tests on the charging level using Structure 
A. We shall assume we are optimising the overall net benefit. The main expected effects of road 
pricing are listed in Table 5.1, with benefits denoted by (+) and disbenefits (-). Some of these 
will cancel exactly, while others will be offsetting. 
Table 5.1: Main expected effects of road pricing 
Payments of charges by drivers 
Receipts of charges by local government 
Time savings by continuing drivers 
Time savings for buses 
Increased waiting times if busesltrains become overcrowded 
Fares paid by ex-drivers 
Fares received from new travellers 
Car operating cost savings by ex-drivers 
Fuel tax losses by UK government 
Operating cost savings for buses due to less congestion 
Operating cost increase for public transport due to extra traffic 
Savings in parking charges by ex-drivers 
Losses in parking charge receipts by local government 
Note: time changes for transfemng drivers could be (+) or (-). 
Table 5.2 gives comparative summary results for various charge levels. The overall best for 
Structure A is A50, i.e. the 50p per crossing tested by LPAC. Rough interpolation suggest that 
the optimal charge would be around 45p. 
This result is similar to that for the aggregate model (Table 2.3) although close inspection 
indicates some differences in the distribution of benefits, particularly for test A100. 
Table 5.2: Benefits from adding road pricing to the LPAC Preferred Strategy, using the 
LPAC charging structure (denoted A). Figures in ;EM for 2001. 
The pattern of effects of charging successively higher charges can be easily seen. Households, 
even non-car owning households, disbenefit increasingly as the charge is raised. Conversely, the 
charging authority, assumed here for convenience to be the local authority, benefits increasingly, 
but at a declining rate. The "gap" is more than made up by (increasing) benefits to freight traffic 
and public transport operators. The latter take more fares revenue as motorists are priced off of 
the road. The disbenefits to motorists of pricing them off the road are accounted for in the 
household benefit figures. The UK government is here not assumed to be receiving any of the 
revenue, and so disbenefits very slightly as charges are increased due to reductions in receipts 
from taxation on motoring. 
Table 5.3 investigates the distributional implications. The broad pattern is to follow the trip 
weighted distribution of households, i.e. household types disbenefit roughly in proportion to how 
many trips they make. Beyond this we can see that non-car owning households disbenefit slightly 
less than proportionately to their trip making. Compared to the numbers of households they 
disbenefit much less than proportionately. The main losers are clearly the middle-income car 
owning households (C12). Poor car owning households disbenefit slightly more than 
proportionately, while rich car owning households (C13) disbenefit less than proportionately to 
their trip making, but more than proportionately to their numbers. 
The distributional impact does not vary greatly as the charge is varied, and the above can be taken 
to apply for the optimal charge of 45150p. It appears that as the charge level is increased there 
is a slight tendency for the distribution of benefits to more closely resemble the distribution of 
household trip making. 
Table 5.3: Distributional implications of the results of Table 5.2 
NB. As elsewhere (unless otherwise stated), a common value of time has been assumed for all 
household types. 
Household 
Type 
CO1 
C02 
C03 
C11 
C12 
C13 
6. THE IMPACT OF ROAD PRICING FOR THE THREE CORDON 
STRUCTURE (STRUCTURE B) 
In this section we report results of setting various charge levels on the three cordons together, but 
without the screenline charges in Central London. Again the results for the LPAC Preferred 
Strategy without road pricing are used as a base and results presented as differences from this 
position. Table 6.1 gives the results for six levels of charges; these apply to all three cordons, 
each way. 
% of 
Households 
18 
7 
7 
18 
30 
20 
One surprising feature of these runs is that the B25 and B50 runs show a disbenefit to freight. 
This had not occurred for A25 or A50 (see Table 5.2) and is hard to explain. We presume that 
freight experienced a mix of benefits and disbenefits as charges are imposed and that the net 
effect for A25 and A50 was positive, whereas for B25 and I350 the net effect was negative due 
to loss of benefits in Central London from traffic reduction attributable to the screenline charges. 
As a rough guide to the magnitude of the revenue from these screenline charges, we can compare 
Local Government benefits in Table 5.2 with those in Table 6.2. For A25 the benefits are twice 
those for B25 (f101.8M p.a. as against f50.4M pa.) and the position is similar for the 50p and 
lOOp charges. Clearly the dropping of the screenline charges is not a trivial matter, and so the 
reported effect on freight is plausible. 
Another way of looking at the general relationship between Table 5.2 and Table 6.1 is that each 
penny of crossing charge in Table 5.2 has roughly the same impact as 2p of crossing charge in 
Table 6.1. For example, whereas 451501, was optimal in Table 5.2, it appears that lOOp (or a little 
over that) is optimal for Table 6.1. Interpolation using statistical techniques suggests 102.5~ as 
the "exact" optimum, but we are not working to that level of accuracy and so we will call this 
1001,. Above this charge level the receipts level off and the disbenefits to households are no 
longer exceeded by the combined increased benefits to freight and public transport operators. 
% of 
Persons 
10 
6 
6 
16 
35 
27 
% of 
Trips 
6 
4 
6 
15 
38 
31 
% of Net Disbenefits 
A25 
7 
4 
5 
17 
43 
24 
A50 
6 
4 
5 
17 
42 
25 
A100 
6 
5 
b 
16 
41 
27 
Table 6.1: Benefits from adding mad pricing to the LPAC Preferred Strategy, using the 3- 
cordon charging structure (denoted B). Figures for 2001 in ;EM p.a. 
Table 6.2: Distributional implications of the results of Table 6.1 
Code 
Crossing Charge 
Household Types 
CO1 
C02 
C03 
C11 
C12 
C13 
Households 
Freight 
Operators 
Local Government 
UK Government 
TOTAL 
NB. As elsewhere (unless otherwise stated), a common value of time has been assumed for all 
household types. 
B25 
2 5 ~  
-3.6 
-2.0 
-2.0 
-10.0 
-23.6 
-12.2 
-53.3 
-24.7 
23.4 
50.4 
-1.4 
-5.5 
Household 
Type 
CO1 
C02 
C03 
C11 
C12 
C13 
Table 6.2 reports the distributional effects of the various charge levels with this structure. Poor 
non-car owners disbenefit in proportion to their trip making. Other non-car owners dishenefit less 
than in proportion to their trip making. In all cases non-car owning households disbenefit less 
than in proportion to their numbers. Poor and middle income car owners disbenefit more than 
in proportion either to their numbers or their trip making, faring slightly worse than they did with 
Structure A charging (Table 5.3). Rich car owning households disbenefit less than in proportion 
to their trip making, but more than in proportion to their numbers as for Structure A. Once again 
there is little change in the distribution of disbenefits as the charge level is increased. Comparing 
B50 
SOP 
-5.0 
-2.5 
-2.2 
-14.4 
-34.3 
-16.8 
-75.2 
-7.6 
31.3 
79.4 
-3.2 
24.8 
% of 
Households 
18 
7 
7 
18 
30 
20 
BlOO 
1 OOp 
-7.6 
-4.1 
-4.1 
-21.4 
-52.2 
-27.8 
-117.1 
6.9 
43.2 
100.4 
-4.0 
29.3 
% of 
Persons 
10 
6 
6 
16 
35 
27 
B150 
1 5Op 
-9.7 
-5.7 
-6.4 
-25.8 
-64.1 
-37.4 
-149.1 
15.6 
53.8 
109.7 
-4.3 
25.6 
% of 
Trips 
6 
4 
6 
15 
38 
31 
B200 
2 0 0 ~  
-11.3 
-6.9 
-8.1 
-28.1 
-79.0 
-43.2 
-167.6 
20.2 
60.4 
103.0 
-4.4 
11.7 
% of Net Dishenefits 
B25 
7 
4 
4 
19 
44 
23 
B50 
7 
3 
3 
19 
46 
22 
BlOO 
7 
4 
4 
18 
45 
24 
B150 
7 
4 
4 
17 
43 
25 
B200 
7 
4 
5 
16 
42 
26 
the two charging structures, A and B, at their optimal charge (A50 and B100) there is little 
difference in the incidence of disbenefits; the main difference being the relatively worse position 
of middle income car owners under B100. 
7. THE IMPACT OF ROAD PRICING FOR THE CENTRAL CORDON 
STRUCTURE (STRUCTURE C) 
We now turn to the third pricing structure tested, denoted C, namely the single cordon around 
Central London. Benefit results are presented in Table 7.1. Clearly a given crossing charge will 
now raise much reduced revenue since the number of charged cordons has been reduced hy a 
factor of three. Hence, if we compare the Local Government benefit of a lOOp cro-zkg charge, 
Table 7.1 shows E38M p.a. while Table 6.1 shows flOOM p.a. It follows that we shall be 
interested in much higher charge levels than for structures A or B. By starting testing at a lOOp 
crossing charge we observe none of the disbenefits to freight noted in Table 6.1. 
The optimal charge appeared to be in the range 400p to 600p, so an additional run was made at 
500p, which turned out the best of those m. Statistical interpolation suggests 462p as the "exact" 
optimum. Interestingly this is four and a half times the optimal charge for Structure B, rather than 
three as might have been expected. The revenue from these high charges, though, is much smaller 
than that for the lower charges of Structure B. There the BlOO revenue was about f100M pa., 
whereas the C400 revenue is less than f30M p.a., and falling as the crossing charge is increased. 
For the first time in these tables, we see the disbenefit to households falling as the charge is 
raised. However, the local authority simultaneously loses a vast amount of charge and parking 
revenue. For the optimum Structure A charge (A50) the disbenefit to households was f 171.5M 
p.a. For the optimum Structure B charge (B100) the disbenefit to households was £117.1M p.a. 
For the optimal Structure C charge in the range C400 to C500, we find the dishenefit to 
households much lower, at f73M to f64M p.a. Conversely, the associated benefits to public 
transport operators and Local Government are also lower, although freight does very well. The 
overall highest net benefit of allmns is for A50, which has a net benefit of f38M p.a. The 
limited size of revenues generated for Local Government substantially reduces the henefits of 
Structure C. Again, A50 is the best in this respect, with f150M p.a. generated for Local 
Government. Structure A is also the most robust against "overcharging", i.e. setting the charge 
too high. Setting charges at twice the optimum level for Structure A reduces total net benefit by 
50% (AlOO), but for Structure B this rises to 60% (B200 v B100) and for Structure C over 100% 
of the total net benefits are lost. 
Turning to the distributional effects of Structure C, we find that Table 7.2 shows a much less 
satisfactory picture than Tables 5.3 or 6.2. At our optimal range (C400 to C500) poor non car 
owners disbenefit in more than twice the proportion to their trip making, although still not quite 
in proportion to their numbers. Middle and high income non-car owners disbenefit mart: than in 
proportion to their numbers or their trip making. Poor car owners disbenefit roughly in proportion 
to their numbers, but slightly more than proportionately to their trip making. Middle income car 
owners disbenefit in proportion to their numbers, but much less than in proportion to their trip 
making. Rich car owners are the big gainers, disbenefiting much less than in proportion to their 
trip making and even less than in proportion to their numbers. Furthennore, these inequities are 
no longer stable against level of charge, but become increasingly regressive as charges are raised. 
Table 7.1: Benefits from adding road pricing to the LPAC Preferred Strategy, using only 
the central (ie "innermost") cordon (denoted C). Figures are net benefits in ;EM for 2001. 
Table 7.2: Distributional impacts analysis of the results of Table 7.1 
Code 
Crossing 
Charge 
Household 
Types 
CO1 
C02 
C03 
C11 
C12 
C13 
Households 
Freight 
Operators 
Local Govt. 
UK Gov~. 
TOTAL 
NB. As elsewhere (unless otherwise stated), a common value of time has been assumed for all 
household types. 
ClOO 
loop 
-6.1 
-3.3 
-3.8 
-9.3 
-20.6 
-12.1 
-55.2 
1.9 
22.3 
38.0 
-3.5 
3.6 
House- 
hold 
Type 
CO1 
C02 
C03 
C11 
C12 
C13 
C200 
200p 
-9.4 
-5.8 
-7.1 
-11.7 
-24.8 
-15.4 
-74.2 
18.1 
27.1 
38.5 
-4.3 
5.1 
% of 
Trips 
6 
4 
6 
15 
38 
3 1 
% of 
House- 
holds 
18 
7 
7 
18 
30 
20 
C400 
4 0 0 ~  
-12.1 
-7.7 
-10.4 
-1 1.9 
-19.9 
-11.2 
-73.1 
37.6 
34.5 
26.0 
-5.5 
19.6 
% of 
Persons 
10 
6 
6 
16 
35 
27 
% of Net Disbenefits 
C500 
SOOp 
-12.1 
-7.2 
-9.5 
-11.4 
-16.4 
-7.7 
-64.2 
40.9 
36.5 
12.9 
-5.8 
20.4 
ClOO 
11 
6 
7 
17 
37 
22 
C500 
19 
11 
15 
18 
26 
12 
C6OO 
6o'& 
-12.0 
-6.5 
-8.4 
-11.4 
-14.8 
-6.2 
-59.2 
41.8 
40.0 
-2.1 
-5.9 
14.5 
C200 
13 
8 
10 
16 
34 
21 
C800 
8OOp 
-11.4 
-4.7 
-5.1 
-10.3 
-9.6 
-2.8 
-43.8 
52.4 
43.2 
-46.8 
-7.2 
-2.1 
C600 
20 
11 
14 
19 
25 
11 
C400 
17 
11 
14 
16 
27 
15 
C800 
26 
11 
12 
24 
22 
6 
8. COMPARISON OF CHARGING STRUCTURES 
Table 8.1 compares the best runs under each structure, i.e. approximately optimal charge levels. 
Car owners clearly do worst under the A structure, while the C structure is worst for non-car 
owners. For some reason freight does not do well under the B structure; it does best under the 
C structure. Public transport operators do best under the A structure, but there is not much 
difference. Local Government does best under the A structure. When comparing the effects of 
the three charging structures, we should remember that the differences are not merely spatial, but 
temporal. The outer two cordons in both structures A and B apply off-peak only, whereas the 
whole of Structure C's charging operates all day. 
Table 8.1: Comparison of the net benefits of optimal charge runs for the three charging 
structnres. Figures in ;EM for 2001. 
Distributional effects will in practice be mitigated or exacerbated by whatever is done with the 
charge revenues raised. Table 8.2 investigates the effect, for the runs given in Table 8.1, of 
distributing government (local and national) net revenues in proportion to household numbers. 
We are not suggesting that such a scenario is at all lkely. In the recent past surplus government 
revenues have been dissipated in income tax reductions, favouring the rich. 
CODE 
Household Types 
CO1 
C02 
C03 
C04 
C05 
C06 
Households 
Freight 
Operators 
Local Government 
UK Government 
TOTAL 
The most striking feature of Table 8.2 is that non-car owners are shown as net beneficiaries of 
structures A and B with their optimal charges (A50 and B100). Conversely, middle and upper 
income car owners are worst off under those structures. AU households disbenefit for Structure 
C, the benefits mostly going to freight. This again suggests that the C structure should not he 
considered favourably. From Table 8.2 the choice between A50 and BlOO becomes clearer. We 
had previously seen A50's advantage in overall net benefit. We now see that A50 has no negative 
aspects relative to B100. Poor non-car owners are protected, and poor car owners have relatively 
little net disbenefit. Middle and upper income car owners lose out, but the large dishenefit figures 
shown are spread out over a large proportion of households (45% in these two groups). 
A50 
-10.7 
-7.5 
-9.2 
-28.5 
-72.6 
-43.1 
-171.5 
19.9 
44.7 
150.7 
-5.4 
38.4 
C500 
-12.1 
-7.2 
-9.5 
-11.4 
-16.4 
-7.7 
-64.2 
40.9 
36.5 
12.9 
-5.8 
20.4 
BlOO 
-7.6 
-4.1 
-4.1 
-21.4 
-52.2 
-27.8 
-1 17.1 
6.9 
43.2 
100.4 
-4.0 
29.3 
C400 
-12.1 
-7.7 
-10.4 
-11.9 
-19.9 
-11.2 
-73.1 
37.6 
34.5 
26.0 
-5.5 
19.6 
Table 8.2: Comparison of the net benefits of optimal charges for the three charging 
structures, with national and local govenunent net benefits redistributed to households in 
proportion to their numbers. Figures in EM for 2001. 
Table 8.3: Comparison of the net benefits of optimal charge runs for the three charging 
structures, with national and local government net benefits redistributed to households in 
proportion to their tripmaking. Figures in ;EM for 2001. 
CODE 
Household Types 
CO1 
C02 
C03 
C11 
C12 
C13 
Households 
Freight 
Operators 
TOTAL 
Many transport commentators have supposed that revenues would be used to improve public 
transport, thereby benefiting the poor andlor non-car owners. This however would require further 
strategy tests with the model. A simpler way of testing such an approach is to distribute the net 
receipts to government in proportion to tripmaking. Table 8.3 repeats the exercise, but with net 
benefits of central and local government distributed amongst householders in proportion to their 
tripmaking. This clearly shows Structure C to be much more regressive than Structure A, 
although rich car owners actually fare better under A50 than either C400 or C500. Rich non-car 
owners do best under Structure B. In all cases middle income car owners face disbenefits but for 
Structure A these are more than proportional to their tripmaking while for Structure C they are 
less than proportional. 
A50 
15.5 
2.7 
1 .O 
-2.3 
-29.0 
-14.0 
-26.2 
19.9 
44.7 
38.4 
The results shown in Tables 8.2 and 8.3 are only meant to be illustrative of what might be the 
overall distributional effects. If the revenue were used to help poorer households, with subsidised 
CODE 
Household type 
CO1 
C02 
C03 
C11 
C12 
C13 
Households 
Freight 
Operators 
TOTAL 
BlOO 
9.8 
2.6 
2.6 
-4.0 
-23.3 
-8.5 
-20.8 
6.9 
43.2 
29.3 
A50 
-2.0 
-1.7 
-0.5 
-6.7 
-17.4 
1.9 
-26.2 
19.9 
44.7 
38.4 
BlOO 
-1.8 
-0.2 
1.7 
-6.9 
-15.6 
2.1 
-20.8 
6.9 
43.2 
29.3 
C400 
-8.4 
-6.2 
-8.9 
-8.2 
-13.7 
-7.1 
-52.5 
37.6 
34.5 
19.6 
C400 
-10.9 
-6.9 
-9.2 
-8.8 
-12.1 
-4.8 
-52.5 
37.6 
34.5 
19.6 
C500 
-10.8 
-6.7 
-9.0 
-10.1 
-14.3 
-6.3 
-57.1 
40.9 
36.5 
20.4 
C500 
-11.7 
-6.9 
-9.1 
-10.3 
-13.2 
-5.5 
-57.1 
40.9 
36.5 
20.4 
good quality public transport, then they might even become net beneficiaries overall. No account 
is taken here, of course, of the potential adverse effect of toad pricing on city centre facilities, 
which, if it caused migration of these beyond the M25, would impose great disbenefits on non-car 
owners. However, the structure which might be expected to be most generally affected by such 
effects, (namely C, the Central cordon only) does not emerge from the limited testing performed 
in this paper at all well. 
9. CHANGES IN ROAD TRAFFIC 
In this section we will investigate the implied elasticities of car trips with respect to changes in 
the charge. Working Paper 345 (Fowkes, Sherwood and Nash (1993)) has given the evidence on 
elasticities that we have found from investigating the literature. We now wish to find the implied 
elasticities built into our START model of London, and investigate how they vary in response to 
various input changes. In particular, if we were to find the implied elasticity at our starting 
position to be implausible, then we could adjust the parameters of the model to rectify this. In 
the event this was unnecessary as the implied elasticities at the starting position were small, but 
not implausibly small given the findings of our literature review and other relevant considerations. 
In some cases we were able to measure elasticities at particular points by performing two runs 
very close together, e.g. a charge of 50p and a charge of 50.5~. However, this is very expensive 
in computing time and even in physical computer "space" requirements. We were already using 
a very expensive microcomputer (not funded by this project) and the file sizes were such that 
downloading to other computer storage systems was deeply unattractive. Consequently, the 
number of runs of START that could be kept for in-depth analysis was limited, and preference 
had to be given for trying meaningfully different charge values rather than 1%) va~+ations. 
However, some of the latter were performed and these are reported next. Thereafter, elasticity 
values are derived as "arc elasticities" based on sizeable changes in charges. 
The workings of the START model did not permit disaggregation of the traffic statistics by our 
car ownershiplincome classification. Hence all our elasticities are for car trips by all households. 
It was possible to disaggregate trips (but not trip kilometres) by the four START journey 
purposes:- 
HBW: Home Based Work 
HBE: Home Based Education 
HBO: Home Based Other 
NHB: Nan-Home Based 
Unfortunately, the traffic statistics available from the EVAL program as supplied related to the 
whole road system, including trips tolfrom external zones, i.e. well beyond London. This is one 
reason for expecting relatively low elasticity values from the model. 
A further reason for expecting low elasticity values is that the values we shall derive are not 
"pure" elasticities in the usual sense. By this we mean that "all else" has not been held constant. 
As we change the charge level, the model's many adjustment mechanisms work to counter the 
direct effect of the charge. For example, as the charge level is raised there will be a direct effect 
as some traffic is priced off the roads. This direct effect is what we would wish to have in order 
to calculate a pure elasticity. However, the model immediately adjusts to the new situation by 
noting that congestion has fallen, and hence road speeds have risen. This is allowed to have an 
effect on traffic levels by attracting additional road traffic to partly take the place of those priced 
off. These additional users will be ones who judge the extra monetary cost to them (if any) to 
be outweighed by the true saving. For example, if a cordon charge scheme is used, some traffic 
passing through the cordon will be priced off. There is then more road space for traffic operating 
within that cordon, and so facing no charge. The model's reported traffic statistics, used here to 
calculate elasticities, are the composite of all direct and indirect effects of the charge. Since their: 
are likely to be significant offsetting effects, we should expect the measured elasticities to be 
significantly lower than the corresponding true "pure" elasticities. However, for policy makers, 
similarly unable to hold all else constant, the elasticities presented here are likely to be most 
relevant. 
Tables 9.1 and 9.2 give some elasticity results for Structure A applied to the LPAC preferred 
strategy. Table 9.1 presents point elasticity estimates, first for the pure charge, and secondly for 
total car costs, where other (ie non-charge) costs are taken to he equivalent to the charge costs 
at the £1 level. This latter assumption is purely arbitrary since we have no data on the 
proportions paying charges, the amount they pay, or the time average level of non-motoring costs. 
The small survey by HFA, ITS, ACCENT (1993) found the average car journey cost to be £2.05 
for an average journey of 24 miles (out and back). The higher "other" car costs are, the lower 
the propodion that the charge will form of total cost and so the higher will he the estimate of 
elasticity resulting from any given fall in car trips. Furthermore, for structures A and B the 
charging at the outer cordons is peak only. In any event, under all structures, there is no 
suggestion that all trips will face charges. 
Table 9.1 shows that the pure charge elasticities are very small. A 1% change in charge causes 
about a 0.03% change in trips. Non-home based trips are the most elastic and "Homt: Based 
Other" trips least elastic, although there are some "blips" in the data. The charge elasticities do 
not appear to vary much with the charge level, which is surprising. 
The cost elasticities were derived by scaling up the charge elasticities to take account of the 
assumption that a 1% change in charge is a much smaller percentage change in cost. The results 
in Table 9.1 show that a typical value of cost elasticity is -0.06, i.e. a 1% change in cost will 
bring about a 0.06% change in trips. The relativities with respect to journey purpose are, by 
definition the same as for the charge elasticities. It also follows from the lack of relation between 
the charge elasticities and the charge levels, that the cost elasticities must fall with charge level. 
This is a rather undesirable result. The actual sizes of the cost elasticities are not out of line with 
values from the literature or as found by HFA, ITS, ACCENT (1993), but the patterns and 
relationships of the various values are not pleasing. 
Turning to Table 9.2 we move from point elasticities to arc elasticities, here defined as 
EL (TRIPS; COST) = l T r i ~ s  1 - T r i ~ s  2) (Cost 1 + Cost 2) 
(Trips 1 + Trips 2) (Cost 1 - Cost 2) 
Also shown is the base data on trips at the various charge levels, and the same data expressed as 
percentages of the trips at zero charge. It can be seen that even the £1 charge level has little 
effect on trip levels, for no journey purpose causing more than a 5% suppression of trip numbers. 
Home Based Education is least affected by the charges, and this is confirmed by the cost elasticity 
figures given, again on the assumption that "other" costs are the equivalent on average to the El  
charge costs. This result is contrary to that of HFA, ITS, ACCENT (1993) who found education 
at the top end of the elasticity range. However, peculiarities in their sample could explain this 
away, since it was only at very high charge levels that this was pronounced. Moreover, many 
HBE trips are of short distance, and less likely to cross charging cordons. 
Table 9.1: Point elasticities for various charge levels on the LPAC Preferred Strategy, with 
the LPAC Structure (denoted A) 
DEMAND = CAR TRIPS 
Table 9.2: Arc elasticities for various charge level combinations on the LPAC Preferred 
Strategy, with the LPAC Structure (Denoted A) 
(iii) Arc Cost Elasticities for moving from Zero Charge to Stated Charge, 
assuming that "Other" Costs a t  Zero Charge are equivalent to the lOOp Charge 
HBW 
HBE 
HBO 
NHB 
ALL 
-0.065 
-0.027 
-0.062 
-0.074 
-0.063 
-0.072 
-0.014 
-0.073 
-0.077 
-0.069 
-0.068 
-0.019 
-0.067 
-0.075 
-0.065 
The average level of the cost elasticities is once again around -0.06, with most journey purposes 
showing values around -0.07, the average being brought down by the low elasticities for 
education, discussed above. Of the rest, Non-Home Based trips have the highest elasticities, hut 
there is not much difference between them. Three sets of arc elasticities have been found, by 
comparing each charge level in turn with the non-charge situation. We could have compared pairs 
of charge levels, and did in fact do a few of these, but this course was not felt worth pursuing. 
HFA, ITS, ACCENT (1993) had found arc cost elasticities to rise as higher charges were imposed, 
hut Table 9.2 shows no evidence of this. The former study had found particularly high arc 
elasticities, sometimes approaching unity but these were for very large charge levels. Section 5 
of this paper found the optimal charge level for this charge structure to he about Sop, so there 
seems little to be gained in considering charges outside the range presented in Table 8.2. 
Table 9.3 repeats the exercise but for Structure B (ie just the three cordons). Daily car trips are 
shown for 25p, Sop, 100p, 150p and 200p charges in part (i) of the table, and these are 
comparable with the "0" column of Table 9.2, where the zero charge trip numbers are shown. 
Taking percentages for the former of the latter gives part (ii) of the table. Even a 200p charge 
never causes more than a 4% reduction for any journey purpose. Most interestingly, we see that 
the model predicts that education trips (HBE) will be greater with a 25p or Sop charge than 
without a charge. This can be put down to the complex second order effects described earlier, 
which we generally feel are greatly reducing our measured elasticities relative to the true pure 
elasticities. With percentages greater than 100% it is, of course, impossible to get an elasticity 
estimate at all. For the other entries the corresponding elasticity values are reported in part (iii) 
of the table, where it has been assumed that the non-charge motoring costs are equivalent to the 
200p charge, on average. In Table 9.2 we had used a lOOp charge, but that charging structure 
included screenline charges and we gave reasons in Section 6 for believing that every penny of 
charge in Structure A was equivalent to 2p of charge in Structure B. 
Looking at Table 9.3 (iii) in more detail, we again see very low elasticities for education. The 
only way for us to explain this is to say that the predicted traffic levels for 2001 in London are 
sufficiently high for congestion effects to hold a lot of education related trips off of the road, 
going instead by foot, cycle or public transport. With road pricing, congestion is reduced and 
relatively few education trips are affected by charges due to their generally short distance nature 
(i.e. tending not to cross cordons). The improved road conditions therefore cause education trips 
to switch mode to car, leading to the sort of result we have obtained. These figures certainly do 
not represent a pure price elasticity. 
Leaving aside education, most of the other elasticities are not much different from the -0.06 
previously found. They do tend to be lower than those shown in Table 9.2 for Structure A, 
though. At the optimal charge (BlOO), one might say that a typical elasticity was -0.05. The 
derived elasticities tend to fall as the charge level increases. 
Table 9.4 repeats the same exercise, but for the central cordon only structure (C). Again predicted 
car trips for each charge level, by journey purpose, are shown in part (i). Interestingly, work trips 
initially decline as charge rises (as expected) but at about a 400p charge they start to rise again. 
This is consistent with the belief that work journeys to Central London tend to be by public 
transport, with car being a minor mode. Hence we might expect a central cordon not to intercept 
relatively many car work trips. As other, possibly "through" traffic is removed from people's 
localities by the effect of the central charge, then new car work trips can take advantage of the 
eased congestion conditions. As has been commented earlier, the elasticity values calculated will 
be composite ones and not pure price elasticities. 
Table 9.3: Arc elasticities for various eharge level combinations on the LPAC Preferred 
Strategy, with the 3 cordon charging structure (denoted B) 
Part (ii) of Table 9.4 reports the percentage of zero charge trips that continue at each charge level. 
Part (iii) reports the implied elasticities. Again these tend not to be too far removed from -0.06. 
The work elasticities (HBW) become very small, for reasons just discussed, as the charge level 
increases. Education elasticities are low, but not as low as for the other charging structures (Tahle 
8.2 and 8.3). The assumption made for non-charge motoring costs in Tahle 8.4 (iii) is that they 
are equivalent to an 800p charge. This is consistent with our earlier finding that lp  of charge on 
Structure B was equivalent to 4p on Structure C. If too high it would explain some of the high 
elasticity values obtained for the lower charge values in Table 8.4 (iii). For the optimal range of 
charges, as found earlier, namely C400 to C500, if we exclude work and education for the reasons 
previously discussed, a typical elasticity of -0.06 once again emerges. 
ALL 
Before closing this section we repeat once more that what we have referred to as elasticities are 
by no means price elasticities in the usual sense. Firstly, demand has been allowed to recover 
99.309 
(iii) Arc Cost Elasticities for moving from Zen, Charge to Stated Charge, assuming 
that "Other" Costs at Zero Charge are Equivalent to the 200p Charge at the 3 
Cordons 
98.838 
HBW 
HBE 
HBO 
NHB 
ALL 
98.082 
-0.064 
- 
-0.063 
-0.065 
-0.059 
-0.060 
- 
-0.051 
-0.060 
-0.053 
97.538 
-0.051 
-0.007 
-0.043 
-0.053 
-0.046 
-0.055 
-0.003 
-0.046 
-0.056 
-0.048 
97.116 
-0.048 
-0.01 1 
-0.041 
-0.052 
-0.044 
from a price increase by second round effects due to road congestion changes. Secondly our 
demand variable, car trips, relates to all such trips modelled, many of which will not face any 
charge (for a variety of reasons). 
Table 9.4: Arc elasticities for various charge level combinations on the LPAC Preferred 
Strategy, with just the central cordon (denoted C) 
10. SENSITIVITY TESTING FOR THE EFFECT OF CHANGE IN THE 
MODEL PARAMETERS 
It is our understanding that the parameters of the London START model were carefully 
determined to be those most consistent with the available evidence, and we have no specific 
reason to doubt these values. However, all estimates are subject to some uncertainty, and so we 
wished to obtain a feel for how robust our results would be to changes in these parameters. 
Furthermore, part of the project objective was to investigate the elasticity of traffic to road pricing, 
and one obvious way of affecting the model's elasticities is to change the model's parameters. 
However, START is a very large and complicated model and its parameters must clearly be 
viewed as a whole, i.e. the value of any particular parameter will have been chosen to be 
consistent with the remaining parameters. Having regard to the time and modelling expertise 
available to us, it was clear that only relatively simple changes to the model's parameters could 
be contemplated. In particular, the model contains a complex hierarchical nesting and we decided 
that we could meet our objectives without interfering with it. This left the obvious course of 
action of changing all the model's logsum parameters (here referred to as "lambdas") by a 
common factor (here denoted A). These parameters weight the utility values used to predict 
choices. 
Our first experiment was to radically sh&e the model by a large change to these parameters, and 
so doubled them. Perhaps not unsurprisingly the model would not run with these parameter 
values. This negative result was helpful to us in confirming that it was probably only sensible 
to look at quite small changes to the parameters. Accordingly, we next decided to factor up all 
the logsum parameters by 10%. This time the model did run and the results are sumrnarised in 
Tables 10.1 to 10.3. 
Table 10.1 shows the distribution of benefits from the base model (the LPAC Preferred Strategy, 
without charges) as reported in Table 4.1. This is denoted U. Alongside are the new results 
denoted I., obtained by multiplying the logsum parameter by 1.1. It can he seen that the 
distribution of benefits over household types is hardly affected, the changed parameters only 
having indirect effects. The benefit to freight is also little affected. However, there is a big shift 
in benefits away from transport operators to households. Given the present unsettled state of the 
London bus market, we would in any event not have wished to put much reliance on the model's 
split of benefits between bus users and bus operators for the year 2001. The overall benefit is 
slightly higher. 
Table 10.2 reports tests designed to find the optimum charge. The LPAC regime (Structure A) 
was assumed and so the relevant table for comparisons is Table 5.2. AU the entries in Table 10.2 
are taken relative to those (for A) in Table 10.1 and so already start with slightly higher benefits 
than the equivalent figure in Table 5.2. Despite this, the increased benefits relative to the 
uncharged situation are themselves higher in Table 10.2 than they are in Table 5.2. Once again, 
it is household benefits which have increased. 
We were unable to perform a run with a 25p charge due to model non-convergence and so used 
a 30p charge instead. The optimal charge is slightly below 50p, which is the result obtained from 
Table 5.2 too. As there, rough interpolation suggests an optimum around 45p. Based on this 
limited evidence our feeling is that our results regarding optimal charges are unlikely to be 
adversely affected by any imprecision in the estimates of the logsum parameters used in the 
model. 
Table 10.3 investigates the distribution effects when using the revised logsum parameters, and 
should be compared with Table 5.3. Again, the pattern of distributional benefits is remarkably 
similar between the two tables. Again, we conclude that the analysis of distributional effects 
presented in this paper is unlikely to be overly sensitive to any imprecision in the estimates of the 
logsum parameters used. 
Table 10.1: Comparative benefits, using the LPAC Preferred Strategy without charges, of 
the model with its usual parameters (denoted U) and with these parameters raised by 10% 
(denoted 1)  
Table 10.2: Effect of placing various charges onto the LPAC Preferred Strategy, having 
raised the model parameter (the lambdas) by 10%. Figures in £M for 2001. 
Household Types 
CO 1 
C02 
C03 
C11 
C12 
C13 
Households 
Freight 
Operators 
Local Government 
UK Government 
TOTAL 
Benefit 
(EM in 
2001) 
u 
7.5 
8.1 
12.8 
18.5 
54.4 
47.0 
148.1 
18.6 
1 
} 43.3 
] 
210.0 
Percentage of 
Household Benefits 
u 
5 
6 
9 
12 
37 
32 
Benefit 
(EM 
in 2001) 
a 
8.4 
9.1 
14.5 
21.8 
64.5 
55.2 
177.1 
22.4 
1 
} 14.1 
1 
213.6 
Percentage of 
Household Benefits 
a 
5 
5 
8 
12 
37 
31 
Table 10.3: Distributional impacts of the results of Table 10.2 
NB. As elsewhere (unless otherwise stated) a common value of time has heen assumed for al l  
household types. 
Table 10.4: Arc elasticities for various charge level combinations on the LPAC Preferred 
Strategy, with the LPAC Charging Structure (denoted A) with the model parameters (the 
lambdas) raised by 10% 
Household 
Type 
CO1 
C02 
C03 
C11 
C12 
C13 
% of 
Households 
18 
7 
7 
18 
30 
20 
% of 
Trips 
6 
4 
6 
15 
38 
3 1 
I I 
(iii) Arc Cnst Elasticities for moving from Zern Charge to Stated Charge, assuming 
that "Other" Cnsts at Zero Charge are equivalent to the lOOp Charge. 
% of Net Dishenefits 
-0.068 
-0.029 
-0.064 
-0.076 
-0.066 
HBW 
HBE 
HBO 
NHB 
ALL 
LA100 
6 
4 
6 
16 
41 
27 . 
LA30 
7 
4 
4 
18 
43 
24 
LA50 
6 
4 
5 
17 
43 
25 
-0.089 
-0.017 
-0.087 
-0.093 
-0.084 
-0.072 
-0.019 
-0.070 
-0.078 
-0.069 
Table 10.4 calculates arc elasticities with the logsum parameters multiplied by 1.1. Table 10.4 
should be compared with Table 9.2, being careful to note that the A25 run could not he rerun for 
changed lambdas and so we present A30 instead. The elasticities in Table 10.4 are definitely 
higher but showing much the same pattern as Table 9.2. Education once again has vely low 
elasticity. For the other journey purposes, except for the 30p charge which shows rather higher 
values; the typical elasticity value is -0.07. We might suppose that further raising the logsum 
parameters would further raise the elasticities, but to only a small extent before the model failed. 
Conversely, reducing the logsum parameters might be expected to reduce the implied elasticities 
somewhat. Relating the results here back to those earlier in this section, suggests that small 
changes in cost elasticities across the board would not have much effect on the determination of 
the optimum charge or the distributions of benefits, although it would affect the overall benefit. 
The caveat at the end of Section 9 on the interpretation of these 'elasticities' applies here &o. 
We could not see how to change the parameters of the model differentially for subgroups of 
travellers, and so were unable to investigate the effect of assuming different elasticities for 
different groups. In any event the literature search reported in WP 345 gave little guidance as to 
how this could be done. However, there will be an implicit effect on elasticities via the joumey 
purposekousehold type split of values of time we have used. 
11. INVESTIGATING THE EFFECT OF EVALUATING TIME 
SAVINGS USING VALUES OF TIME APPLICABLE TO EACH 
HOUSEHOLD TYPE 
In this section we investigate the effect of using variable values of time for evaluation. Up until 
now we have always used a common evaluation value of time for all household types. In fact, 
three values of time are used - one for work, one for non-work, and one for freight, hut they do 
not vary by household type. We have used values of time that vary by household type for 
modelling the traffic effect of the charges. However, for evaluation we have followed the usual 
practice of using a common appraisal value (or equity value) of time. Since we had the individual 
relativities of the behavioural modelling values of time available by household type, we decided 
to investigate what would happen if these values were used for appraisal. 
Firstly, we must introduce a note of caution. It must be realised that the overall value of time is, 
implicitly at least, a trip weighted average. Hence for given values of time by household type, 
any change in the distribution of trips by household type will throw out the average. Since 
changing the distribution of trips by household type is exactly what we are evaluating it is clear 
that there will be interpretational problems, and that there will be a case for constraining certain 
values to be equal to values found earlier. When, as with road pricing and with the LPAC 
Preferred Strategy, we are giving people time savings, it is hardly surprising if benefits rise as the 
evaluation value of time is raised. If by allowing trips to be switched from low value of time 
groups we raise the average value of time used for evaluation then we will see increased benefits. 
Depending on our purposes, we may or may not wish to do this. 
Table 11.1 repeats the analysis of the LPAC Preferred Strategy using multiple values of time, hoth 
for modelling and evaluation. Overall benefits are seen to rise from f210M p.a. to f226M pa., 
reflecting the higher average value of time assumed. Nan-car owners dishenefit relatively, 
although rich non-car owners do benefit slightly in absolute terms. Poor car-owners dishenefit 
absolutely and relatively. Rich car owners benefit significantly both absolutely and relatively. 
Table 11.1: The effect of using variable evaluation values of time for the LPAC Preferred 
Strategy. Figures are benefits in ;EM for 2001. 
NB. The bracketed figures show the percentage of household benefits by household type. 
Household Types 
co1 
C02 
C03 
C11 
C12 
C13 
Households 
Freight 
Others 
TOTAL 
Table 11.2: Effects of placing various charges onto the LPAC Preferred Strategy using the 
LPAC structure (denoted A) with separate evaluation values of time for each household 
type. Figures are benefits in ;EM for 2001. 
SINGLE EVALUATION 
VOT 
7.5 (5%) 
8.1 (5%) 
12.8 (9%) 
18.5 (12%) 
54.4 (37%) 
47.0 (32%) 
148.1 
18.6 
43.3 
2 10.0 
Table 11.2 shows the revised effects of charges on the LPAC structure, compared to the benefits 
from the LPAC Preferred Strategy. Comparing Table 11.2 with Table 5.2 we find poor non-car 
owners experiencing a reduction of up to a third in disbenefit, medium income non-car owners 
and low income car owners experiencing reductions of around a fifth in disbenefit, high income 
non-car owners and medium income car owners scarcely affected, and high income car owners 
MULTIPLE EVALUATION 
VOT 
5.7 (3%) 
7.2 (4%) 
13.1 (8%) 
16.6 (10%) 
55.7 (34%) 
66.1 (40%) 
164.4 
18.6 
43 .O 
226.0 
MA100 
loop 
-10.3 
-10.6 
-17.5 
-37.3 
-115.5 
-110.9 
-302.1 
31.4 
255.8 
-15.0 
Code 
Crossing charge 
Household type 
CO1 
C02 
C03 
C11 
C12 
C13 
Households 
Freight 
Others 
TOTAL 
MA25 
2 5 ~  
-4.7 
-3.6 
-4.9 
-15.5 
-45.1 
-36.8 
-110.5 
2.4 
128.1 
19.9 
MA50 
SOP 
-7.4 
-6.3 
-9.5 
-24.8 
-74.8 
-65.5 
-188.4 
19.9 
186.8 
18.3 
experiencing around a 50% increase in disbenefit. The optimum charge appears to have fallen 
to around 30-35p. While the household disbenefit at any level of charge has increased by about 
lo%, the disbenefit at the (lower) optimum charge is little different. These changes are consistent 
with the changes in evaluation values of time, and suggest that, on this basis, road pricing may 
be slightly more progressive than indicated in Sections 5-7. 
The optimal charge appears to have fallen to the 30-35p range, but this has the implicit 
assumption that we accept the increase in trip weighted evaluation values of time from the value 
used in Table 5.2. This latter effect, however, does not appear to be large, total household 
disbenefits only rising by about 10%. 
12. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has discussed the results of disaggregating the START model by income group and 
applying it to testing the magnitude and incidence of benefits from road pricing in London. 
We examined three different approaches to pricing; charges for crossing each of three cordons at 
varying distances from Central London with a further charge for crossing screenlines within 
Central London, a similar structure without the screenlines, and a single charge for entering 
Central London. Whilst the outer cordon charges applied in the peak only the Central London 
cordon and screenlines applied all day. For each of these we found the overall best charge, which 
was about 50p in each directions per cordon or screenline crossed for the first option, £ lp per 
cordon for the second and £5 for entering or leaving Central London in the third. Overall, the 
first of these options appeared the most effective, the second one was less beneficial and the third 
by far the poorest in its results. 
We then looked at who gained and who lost. Obviously the public sector gained from the 
revenue, as did public transport and (in most cases) freight operators from an overall operating 
cost saving. Generally all groups of households lost. In most alternatives, the costs were roughly 
proportional to the number of trips made, and therefore were concentrated on better off and car 
owning households, who made more trips than other groups. However, the all day charge for 
entering Central London impacted far more heavily on poorer non car owning households than 
did the other two options. We also examined the effect of ploughing back the revenue the 
government gained from road pricing into the transport sector in such a way as to benefit 
households roughly in proportion to the number of trips they make. For the best road pricing 
option, this largely offset the effects of road pricing, although middle income car owners still had 
significant overall disbenefits. For the all day charge for entering Central London, other groups, 
including poorer non car owners, still had significant disbenefits. The results indicate that a 
government which wished to introduce road pricing but was concerned to ensure that no group 
incurred major disbenefits as a result would need to pay careful attention not just to how the 
revenue from it was used but also to the structure of pricing used. 
While these results have important implications for the design of road pricing systems, it should 
be noted that they raise a series of questions, on the changes in trip making patterns, the effects 
of all day charging, and the impact of other road pricing structures, which still need to he 
addressed. The delay in acquisition of the model and its evaluation package have limited our 
ability, as yet, to explore these further issues. 
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